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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:
Case No. 981781-CA

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

vs.

:
Priority No. 2

SANTOS DOMINGUEZ, JR.,
Defendant/Appellant.

:
:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendant, Santos Dominguez, appeals his conviction of burglary, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1995). This Court has jurisdiction to
hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion by ordering restitution to be paid to an
insurance company where the restitution statute in effect at the time of defendant's
sentencing included insurance companies within its definition of "victims"?

STANDARD OF REVIEW: An appellate court will not disturb an order of
restitution unless the trial court exceeded its authority or abused its discretion.
State v. Westerman. 945 P.2d 695, 696 (Utah App. 1997) (citing State v. Robinson.
860 P.2d 979, 980 (Utah App. 1993), cert, denied. 878 P.2d 1154 (Utah 1994);
State v. Twitchell. 832 P.2d 866, 868 (Utah App. 1992)).

However, where the

trial court's order is premised on statutory interpretation, the appellate court affords the
trial court's interpretation no deference and reviews it for correctness. LL (citing
Ward v. Richfield City. 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990)).
2. If the district court improperly ordered restitution to be split between the victim
and an insurance company, is the proper remedy to eliminate the challenged portion of
the restitution altogether or merely to correct the sentencing order to reflect that all
restitution should be paid directly to the victim?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: An appellate court will not disturb a sentence
"'unless it exceeds that prescribed by law or unless the trial court has abused its
discretion.'" State v. Russell. 791 P.2d 188, 192 (Utah 1990) (quoting State v. Shelby.
728 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah 1986)).

An abuse of discretion will be found only if

no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. State v. Gerrard.
584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978).

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The text of the following statutes, which are pertinent to the resolution of the issues
before this Court, is contained in the body of this brief:
Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.

§ 76-3-201(l)(e)(i) (Supp. 1998)
§ 76-3-201 (4)(a)(i) (Supp. 1997)
§ 76-3-201 (4)(a)(i) (Supp. 1998)
§ 77-38-2(9)(a) (Supp. 1997)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On October 21, 1996, defendant was charged by information with aggravated
burglary, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (1995) (R. 1).
On March 23, 1998, defendant pleaded guilty to burglary, a second degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1995) (R. 24, 26-30). A sentencing hearing
was held on April 27, 1998 (R. 64:2-7), and the district court sentenced defendant to an
indeterminate term of one-to-fifteen years in the Utah State Prison (R. 64:5). However,
defendant's sentence was stayed and defendant was placed on probation (id.).
Additionally, defendant was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $7,724.73 (id.).
A lengthy discussion ensued concerning whether restitution should be paid to the victim
alone or split between the victim, a minor, and the victim's mother's insurance company,
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (Metropolitan Life). However, no determination
on that issue was reached at the hearing (R. 64:5-7).
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On May 4, 1998, the district court signed the Sentence, Judgment and Commitment
in this case (R. 31-33) (attached hereto as "Addendum A"). That order was subsequently
filed on May 12, 1998 (id.). The sentencing order provided that defendant pay restitution
in the amount of $2,554.41 to the victim and $4,793.57 to Metropolitan Life (R. 32).
On May 15, 1998, defendant filed a memorandum in opposition to restitution,
arguing that the district court could not order him to pay restitution to Metropolitan Life
(R. 36-38). Specifically, defendant asserted that insurance companies did not qualify as
"victims" under the restitution statutes in effect at the time of his sentencing (id.).
Following a hearing (R. 44, 64:8-14), the district court entered a Restitution Ruling
on November 6, 1998, which stated:

"The Court finds that restitution is to be

an uninsured loss. Restitution remains at $7,724.73" (R. 51).
Defendant's timely notice of appeal ensued (R. 54).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
No statement of facts beyond those set forth above is necessary to resolve the issues
presented on appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering
restitution to be paid to Metropolitan Life.

Specifically, defendant asserts that

Metropolitan Life is not a "victim" as defined by the relevant statutes in effect at the time
of his sentencing. However, the effective date of the 1998 amendment to Utah's restitution
4

statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (4)(a)(i) (Supp. 1998), was May 4,1998, the same date
that the district court signed its Sentence, Judgment and Commitment in this case. Because
that amendment includes insurance companies within its definition of "victims,"
Metropolitan Life is a "victim" as defined by the restitution statute in effect at the time
of defendants sentencing. Accordingly, the district court's award of restitution to
Metropolitan Life is entitled to affirmance on appeal.
Alternatively, even if the relevant date for determining defendant's restitution
was the date of defendant's sentencing hearing, rather than the date he was sentenced,
that fact is of no avail to defendant. The restitution statute in effect at the time of
defendant's sentencing hearing was Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 1997). Although
the defendant could not be required to directly reimburse an insurance company under that
statute, he was nonetheless liable for full restitution to the victim. See State v. Stirba.
972 P.2d 918, 923 n.4 (Utah App. 1998). Thus, although the sentencing order should not
have reflected restitution in the amount of $2,554.41 to the victim and $4,793.57 to
Metropolitan Life, the district court should have ordered $7,347.98 in restitution to be paid
directly to the victim. Accordingly, because defendant does not challenge the amount of
restitution, but merely the party to whom restitution should be paid, if this Court
determines that reversal and remand is appropriate here, the only remedy on remand to
which defendant is entitled is correction of the sentencing order to reflect that restitution
should be directly paid to the victim, not split between the victim and Metropolitan Life.
5

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION BY ORDERING RESTITUTION TO BE
PAID TO AN INSURANCE COMPANY BECAUSE
INSURANCE COMPANIES QUALIFY AS "VICTIMS"
UNDER THE RESTITUTION STATUTE IN EFFECT
AT THE TIME OF DEFENDANT'S SENTENCING
On appeal, defendant claims that the district court abused its discretion in ordering
restitution to be paid to the victim's mother's insurance company, Metropolitan Life,
because insurance companies did not qualify as a "victims" under the restitution statutes
in effect at the time of his sentencing. Aplt. Brief at 7-10. However, on the date that
defendant's sentence was signed by the district court, May 4, 1998, insurance companies
were included within the definition of "victims" under the relevant statute. Thus,
the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering restitution.
Prior to May 4, 1998, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 1997) provided,
in pertinent part:
(4)(a)(i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity
that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other
sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the defendant
make restitution to victims of crime as provided in this
subsection, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed
to make restitution as part of a plea agreement. For purposes
of restitution, a victim has the meaning as defined in Section
77-38-2
KL (emphasis added). At that time, Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-2 (Supp. 1997) stated:
6

(9)(a) "Victim of a crime" means any natural person
against whom the charged crime or conduct is alleged to have
been perpetrated or attempted by the defendant or minor
personally, or as a party to the offense or conduct or, in the
discretion of the court, against whom a related crime or act is
alleged to have been perpetrated or attempted . . . .
IcL Effective May 4, 1998, section 76-3-201 (4)(a)(i) was amended to read:
(4)(a)(i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity
that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other
sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the defendant
make restitution to victims of crime as provided in this
subsection, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed
to make restitution as part of a plea agreement. For purposes
of restitution, a victim has the meaning as defined in
Subsection (l)(e).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (4)(a)(i) (Supp. 1998) (emphasis added). Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-3-201(l)(e)(i) (Supp. 1998) defines "victim" as "any person whom the court
determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal
activities."
"It is the law of this state . . . that a sentence is not entered until it has been reduced
to writing and signed by the court." State v. Wright. 904 P.2d 1101, 1102 (Utah App.
1995) (citing State v. Currv. 814 P.2d 1150, 1151 (Utah App. 1991) (per curiam)),
cert, denied. 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996); see also State v. Gerrard. 584 P.2d 885, 886-87
(Utah 1978) (entry of sentence itself, not announcement made from the bench, constitutes
the final judgment); State v. Hunsaker. 933 P.2d 415, 416 (Utah App. 1997) (per curiam)
(same); see generally Utah R. App. P. 4(c) (distinguishing between the "announcement"
7

of a sentence and its "entry"). Furthermore, it is well settled that the punishment in force
at the time that the final judgment of sentence is entered controls, "provided that it does
not raise a constitutional question of being an ex post facto law by reason of increasing the
punishment."1 Belt v. Turner. 25 Utah 2d 380, 381, 483 P.2d 425, 426 (1971).
In the case at bar, the district court signed its Sentence, Judgment and Commitment
on May 4, 1998 (R. 31-33). Moreover, that order was not date-stamped until May 12,
1998 (id.). Thus, at the very earliest, defendant was not sentenced until May 4, 1998.
See Wright. 904 P.2d at 1102 (" 'defendant's sentence was not entered until [the date it was
reduced to writing and signed]'") (quoting Curry. 814 P.2d at 1151). At that time,
Utah's restitution statute included insurance companies within its definition of "victims."
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(a)(i) (Supp. 1998); Utah Code Ann. §76-3-201 (l)(e)(i)
(Supp. 1998). Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering restitution
to be paid to Metropolitan Life, a victim of defendant's criminal activities. Accordingly,
the district court's award of restitution is entitled to affirmance on appeal.

1

Defendant has not asserted either below or on appeal that Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-3-201 (4)(a)(i) (Supp. 1998) and Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (l)(e)(i) (Supp. 1998) are
ex post facto laws. In any event, these sections do not violate the prohibition against
ex post facto laws because they do not increase the restitution that may be ordered as a
result of defendant's criminal activities. Instead, they merely clarify to whom the
restitution should be paid. Cf State v. Stirba. 972 P.2d 918, 923 n.4 (Utah App. 1998)
(recognizing that defendant may be ordered to pay the entire restitution amount to the
victim, even though the victim has been reimbursed by an insurance company).
8

POINT II
EVEN IF THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION BY ORDERING RESTITUTION TO BE
SPLIT BETWEEN THE VICTIM AND THE INSURANCE
COMPANY, THE ONLY REMEDY TO WHICH
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED ON REMAND IS
CORRECTION OF THE SENTENCING ORDER
On appeal, defendant asserts that "[a]t all times relative to the Appellant's case,
[Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (4)(a)(i) (Supp. 1997)] was still in effect and the insurance
company could not be considered a victim for restitution purposes." Aplt. Brief at 8-9.
Thus, defendant argues, the district court's award of restitution to Metropolitan Life is
contrary to this Court's decision in State v. Westerman. 945 P.2d 695 (Utah App. 1997).
The State concedes that under the 1997 amendment to section 76-3-20l(4)(a)(i) and
this Court's decision in Westerman. defendant cannot be required to pay restitution directly
to an insurance company. See Westerman. 943 P.2d at 699. However, the question which
was not answered by the Court in Westerman. presumably because it was not presented
therein, is, "What is the appropriate remedy once it is determined that the insurance
company is not entitled to restitution payments?"
Although this Court has not directly addressed that question, the answer to that
question is suggested by language in this Court's recent opinion in State v. Stirba.
972 P.2d 918 (Utah App. 1998). In that case, this Court noted that although Westerman
provides that an insurance company does not fall within the definition of "victim" under

9

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (4)(a)(i) (Supp. 1997), that does not mean that the defendant
may not be held liable for full restitution to the person against whom the charged crime
was perpetrated. State v. Stirba. 972 P.2d 918, 923 n.4 (Utah App. 1998) (citing
State v.Haga. 954 P.2d 1284,1289 (Utah App. 1998)). Instead, the Court recognized that
it is proper to order full restitution to be paid to the victim, even if the victim has already
been reimbursed by his or her insurance company. IcL
At defendant's sentencing hearing in the present case, no decision was made as to
whether restitution should be paid to the victim alone or split between the victim and
Metropolitan Life. See R. 64:2-7. In fact, the only definitive statement on the subject was
the district court's order of restitution in the amount of $7,724.73 (R. 64:5).2 Moreover,
on appeal, defendant does not challenge that amount of restitution. In fact, he concedes
that he caused a total of $7,347.98 in damages to the victim. Aplt. Brief at 4. Instead,
defendant merely argues that he should not be required to pay a portion of that restitution
to Metropolitan Life. IdL at 6-10. Thus, under Westerman and Stirba. the defendant is
correct that the sentencing order should not have reflected restitution in the amount of
$2,554.41 to the victim and $4,793.57 to Metropolitan Life. However, he is incorrect in
assuming that that means that he is entitled to escape liability for the portion of restitution
that was improperly ordered to be paid to Metropolitan Life. Instead, the sentencing

2

This figure includes extradition costs, the award of which is not being challenged
on appeal.
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order should have stated that the victim was entitled to $7,347.98 in restitution because it
was proper to order all restitution to be paid to the victim, even though the victim had been
reimbursed by Metropolitan Life. See Stirba. 972 P.2d at 923 n.4.
Accordingly, if this Court determines that reversal and remand is appropriate here,
the only remedy to which defendant is entitled on remand is correction of the
sentencing order to reflect that restitution should be paid to the victim, not split between
the victim and Metropolitan Life. See State v. Larson, 758 P.2d 901, 904 (Utah 1988)
(remanding for the purpose of correcting the judgment to reflect the actual sentence
imposed); State v. Adams. 26 Utah 2d 377, 489 P.2d 1191, 1194 (1971) ("when sentence
is improper, remand may be for imposition of correct sentence") (citing Ex parte Folck,
102 Utah 470, 132 P.2d 130 (1942)); State v. Beltran-Felix. 922 P.2d 30, 37-38
(Utah App. 1996) (remanding case to district court to correct an improper sentence).3

3

Lastly, defendant attacks the district court's November 6, 1998, Restitution
Ruling, which states in its entirety: "The Court finds that restitution is to be an uninsured
loss. Restitution remains at $7,724.73" (R. 51). It is unclear from the face of this order
whether the district court intended this ruling to be a finding of fact that the victim's losses
were actually uninsured or whether it meant its ruling to be a conclusion of law that
all restitution should be paid directly to the victim. In either event, it does not impact the
outcome of this case because defendant is liable for full restitution to the victim under both
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (4)(a)(i) (Supp. 1997) and Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (4)(a)(i)
(Supp. 1998). Thus, defendant's challenge to this ruling is moot.
11

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the
district court's award of restitution in this case. Alternatively, the State seeks a remand
of this case to the district court for entry of an order clarifying that all restitution should
be paid directly to the victim.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J i _ day of May, 1999.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

P. Yjrtz
NORMAN E. PLATE
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MAY j ' ^ 1988

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.
SANTOS JR DOMINGUEZ,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

STANTON M. TAYLOR
April 27, 1998

PRESENT
Clerk:
marykd
Prosecutor: BRENDA BEATON
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): JONATHAN B PACE
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: November
Video
Tape
:
CO427

969
.'ount: 2 37

CHARGES
1. BURGLARY
Felony
Plea: Not Guilty

(amended)

2nd Degree

- Disposition: 03/23/1998 Guilty

SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of BURGLARY a 2nd Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not
less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State
Prison.
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.

Page 1
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Case No: 961901139
Date:
Apr 27, 1998

SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendants conviction of BURGLARY a 2nd Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180 day(s)
Credit is granted for 92 day(s) previously served.
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE
The defendant may have good time.
ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s).
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation and Parole.
Defendant is granted credit for 92 day(s) served.
Defendant to serve 180 day(s) jail.
PROBATION CONDITIONS
The defendant shall enter into an agreement with the Utah State
Department of Adult Probation and Parole and comply strictly with
its terms and conditions.
The defendant shall violate no law: federal, state or municipal.
The defendant shall report to the Department of Corrections and to
the court whenever required.
The defendant shall refrain from the use of alcohol or illegal
drugs.
The defendant shall submit to search, seizure and chemical testing.
The defendant shall not frequent establishments where alcohol is
the chief menu item nor associate with persons using alcohol or
illegal drugs.
The defendant shall maintain full-time, verifiable employment.
The defendant shall pay restitution in the amount of $2,554.41 to
Matt Hawkins; $4,793.57 to Metropolitan Life; $376.75 Extradition
Cost for a total restitution amount of $7,724.73.
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Case No: 961901139
Date:
Apr 27, 1998
The Court will authorize the defendant's compact to Arizona to
complete probation.
Dated t h i s

±

day nt

, »^£
STANfONMTTTAY]
D i s t r i c t C^urt/frudge
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